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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
n December of 2010, Costco v. Omega came down from the Supreme Court. The 
Switzerland-based watchmaker Omega sold Seamaster Collection watches, which were 
affixed with its copyrighted logo, in the United States as well as in foreign markets. Omega 
priced watches in the United States market higher than elsewhere. Costco obtained Omega’s 
watches from a third party that had purchased the watches abroad, then sold them at its 
membership warehouses for cheaper prices than authorized Omega dealers in the United States. 
Consequently, Omega sued Costco for copyright infringement. Costco pursued a defense based 
on the first sale doctrine in response. While from a legal perspective the case was a copyright 
dispute, this categorization does not make sense from an economic view. Rather, the application 
of economic models reveals that the core issue in Costco centers about price discrimination, not 
copyright. This thesis uses a law and economics framework to analyze the facts of and the 
decision in Costco to determine whether the outcome was welfare maximizing and to assess the 
implications that the case will have on copyright law in the future.  
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“The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.’  To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their 
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information 
conveyed by a work. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is the means by which 
copyright advances the progress of science and art.” 
 
- Justice Sandra Day O’Connor 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
WHEN LUXURY BECOMES CHEAP | COSTCO AND 
OMEGA’S ROCK AROUND THE CLOCK 
 
 
 tiny symbol, etched lightly onto the metal surface on the backside of a watch. Just 
several centimeters in diameter, the logo is not apparent without looking closely. Yet this 
seemingly innocuous figure is more than just a status symbol for a luxury watch. The logo is 
copyrighted. And this one, small, copyrighted, logo has the potential to threaten the livelihood of 
wholesale dealers, online commerce, aftermarkets, and even libraries. It could make renting 
foreign movies illegal and put restrictions on giving gifts, not to mention causing prices to rise 
for imported goods.  
 These are some of the fears that have arisen in the wake of the United State Supreme 
Court’s 2010 decision—or indecision—in Costco v. Omega, 562 U.S.__(2010). The case 
involved the wholesale, members-only warehouse chain Costco, and the Swiss luxury 
watchmaker Omega. Omega manufactured its watches in Europe, and each watch was 
A 
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emblazoned with a small, copyrighted logo on the back. In the United States, Omega price 
discriminated and sold the watches at a higher price than in its other international markets. A 
third party purchased Omega watches abroad, imported them into the United States, and 
consequently sold the watches to Costco. Costco in turn sold the watches to consumers at rates 
that were lower than the prices Omega had designated for the United States market. Furthermore, 
Costco was not an authorized dealer for the particular watches.  
 Omega brought suit against Costco, alleging that because the watches had a copyrighted 
logo on them, Costco was liable for copyright infringement. The question before the court was 
whether the first sale doctrine, which maintains that certain rights are exhausted after the initial 
sale of a copyrighted good, applied to imported goods manufactured abroad. With Justice Kagan 
recusing herself because of prior involvement in the case, the court failed to reach a majority 
opinion and was deadlocked in a 4-4 decision, meaning that the appellate court decision favoring 
Omega—and that the first sale doctrine only applied to goods manufactured domestically—
remained.    
The Supreme Court’s lack of consensus regarding the scope of the first sale doctrine 
incited a series of hypotheses for potential ways the ruling would be construed in the future to 
provide an even broader application of the first sale doctrine. In its amicus brief for the 
petitioner, the Retail Industry Leaders Association called the first sale doctrine the “Magna Carta 
of property rights and open commerce in copies of copyrighted works.”1 The first sale doctrine is 
critical to businesses. It enables the free flow of commerce and the ability to sell genuine 
products without the threat of a copyright infringement lawsuit. In turn, the first sale doctrine 
                                                
1 “Brief Amici Curiae of Retail Industry Leaders Association, et. al., in Support of the Petitioner,” Costco Wholesale 
Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar Association, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1423_PetitionerAmCu7RetailCos.authcheck
dam.pdf > (accessed 24 March 2011), p. 9.  
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gives rise to aftermarkets and makes it possible to rent, lease, resell, lend, and gift goods, 
whether through an organized movie rental store or a neighbor’s garage sale.  
 
*          *          * 
Facially, Costco is a case about copyright infringement.  But from an economic 
perspective, the scenario does not fit the traditional copyright model. Instead, Omega’s 
arguments better align with theories of price discrimination. While Omega sued Costco on the 
grounds of copyright infringement, the watchmaker was masking its desire to price 
discriminate—a strategy that raises prices in the United States and likely reduces domestic 
welfare—in the intricacies of copyright law.  
The foundations for analyzing the Costco decision rest in the law. The first chapter looks 
at the Costco facts closely and the current laws that govern the case, including the Copyright Act 
of 1976 and the United States Code that references the first sale doctrine. Next comes a review of 
the trajectory of court cases that have shaped the first sale doctrine, beginning with Bobbs-
Merrill Company v. Straus, 210 US 339 (1908), a case dealing with Macy’s selling copies of a 
copyrighted book that it purchased from a wholesaler, at prices that were lower than those set by 
the publisher. The case that follows is BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318 (1991), where 
Edmundo Perez purchased BMG Music’s copyrighted recordings that had been manufactured 
abroad, then sold them in the United States. The next pivotal court decision was in Quality King 
Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998). In Quality King, 
L’anza sold hair products with copyrighted logos affixed to the bottles. The goods were 
exported, and Quality King purchased the goods abroad then reimported them back into the 
United States and sold the hair products in California.  
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While the courts have explored many aspects of the first sale doctrine and copyright law, 
a clear policy regarding goods bearing copyrighted logos, especially those produced abroad, is 
lacking. This ambiguity provides an entry point to assess the law through economic models, 
which are introduced in the second chapter. The chapter reviews economic models related to 
intellectual property and the facts of the case, such as patents, copyrights, and price 
discrimination. The similarities to Costco as well as the limitations are assessed for each model. 
Ultimately, this section reveals that traditional models of intellectual property and specifically 
copyright are not relevant, suggesting that the case is not truly about copyright like Omega 
argued. Instead, the models will show that Costco is more about special protections and 
privileges that have been formulated for copyright holders with the first sale doctrine, including 
the ability to price discriminate.  
Finally, the economic theories are applied to the case itself to determine whether or not it 
was decided correctly using a law and economics framework. In particular, Chapter 3 examines 
if the ruling maximizes domestic welfare. The analysis will show that not only was the decision 
unbeneficial in the particular interaction between Costco and Omega, but also that a broad 
sweeping rule that the first sale doctrine should not apply to goods manufactured abroad is 
problematic. In light of the flaws with the decision, this section also looks at the potential for 
other rules that the courts could invoke in similar cases in the future. The first rule comes from 
price discrimination theory, suggesting that the viability of a first sale defense should be decided 
on a case-by-case basis and depend upon the changes on output that result from a copyright 
holder’s ability to price discriminate. The second builds upon Justice Sotomayor’s questioning 
during oral argument and considers if producers, distributors, and retailers could enter into 
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contracts to limit sales, with the first sale doctrine acting as a penalty default rule and any 
remedies coming from those defined under contract law.  
While this case did not have any precedential value due to the deadlock decision, it 
presents questions that the courts are likely to encounter again. For example, the Google Books 
lawsuit shows how developments in technology will make issues of the first sale doctrine not 
only more prevalent, but also increasingly complicated. In the class action copyright 
infringement suit, which was initiated in 2005, Google was accused of not obtaining the 
copyrights over certain works it digitized and published online. In particular, there were a series 
of “orphan works,” or books with no identifiable copyright owner. Even though Google had 
reached a settlement in the lawsuit, a New York federal district court judge, Judge Denny Chin, 
rejected the settlement in March 2011. Afterwards, there was growing speculation that the 
problems of the intersection between technology and copyright would come before Congress and 
that the time was ripe was even broader copyright reform.  
With the scope of the first-sale doctrine expanding with technological innovation, it will 
be important to assess not only the impacts of prior decisions, but also what the effects could be 
for crafting laws in the future. As globalization continues, enabling goods to be manufactured 
and sold around the world, combined with society becoming increasingly digital, law may not 
keep pace with technology. Looking at the law with an economic lens may provide better 
methods for jurisprudence in the interim.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE LAW | HOW COPYRIGHT EXPANDED 
 
he arguments in the Costco case deal predominantly with the United States Copyright Act 
of 1976 and the specific doctrine of first sale. United States Code pertaining to copyright 
has evolved because of technological advancements, but the intent has always remained to 
provide protections to creators over expressive works. Throughout the past century, the courts 
have considered many cases on grounds similar to Costco. While the first pivotal case involved a 
dispute over sales of a book, more recent cases have expanded copyright law to include logos on 
non-copyrighted goods, like in Costco.  
LEGAL PROVISIONS 
HISTORY OF THE COPYRIGHT ACT 
Title 17 of United States Code lays out the fundamental structure for copyright law. It is 
derived from a series of copyright acts that starts with the Copyright Act of 1790, the first set of 
T 
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federal restrictions on copyright that was based on the Statute of Anne in English law.2 The 
Copyright Act of 1909 superseded the Copyright Act of 1790, which was subsequently revised 
sixty-eight years later by the Copyright Act of 1976 (herein, “the Copyright Act). The impetus 
for the 1976 changes was developments in technology such as radio, television, computers, and 
tape recording, for which the prior law did not have any regulations.   
Despite these updates to the Copyright Act, the revisions still posed several challenges 
for court decisions. One of the problems in interpreting the Copyright Act in cases like Costco 
comes from the tension between two sections of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) and 17 
U.S.C. § 109(a).3 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) prohibits the importation, without the copyright owner's 
permission, of copies acquired outside the United States. Congress initially established § 602(a) 
to provide guidelines for the importation of pirated items, or goods made without permission of 
the owner of a copyright, as well as the unauthorized importation of goods that were 
manufactured legally. The original intent of this section was that either action would be 
considered infringement, barring three exceptions: goods imported for governmental use, goods 
used solely for private use and not distribution, and goods imported with fewer than five copies.4  
The conflicting section, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), prevents a copyright owner who has sold copies 
from interfering with the later sale of those copies if they were “lawfully made under this title.”5 
This is the first sale doctrine.  
Essentially, the confusion is that a copyright holder can prohibit products from being 
imported into the United States at any time, but he or she is simultaneously prevented from 
                                                
2“General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976,” United States Copyright Office, September 1977, 
<http://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2011). 
3 See Appendix A and Appendix B for the full text of 17 U.S.C. § 602 and 17 U.S.C. § 109.  
4“General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976,” United States Copyright Office, September 1977, 
<http://www.copyright.gov/reports/guide-to-copyright.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2011). 
5 BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318 (C.A. 9, 1991), <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case= 
13705363198185453600&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 16 March 2011). 
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controlling the goods after the first sale—how then could the copyright holder bar importation 
unless he or she was able to have a say in later sales? Previous rulings, like CBS v. Scorpio 
Music Distributors, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984), have tried to clarify the contradiction and have 
understood the phrase “lawfully made under this title,” to grant first sale protection only to 
copies where the product was originally made and sold legally in the United States.6,7 This means 
that if a good is produced abroad, it can be imported into the United States and the foreign 
manufacturer can retain a degree of control once the product enters the United States, even after 
the first sale.  
FIRST SALE DOCTRINE 
The first sale doctrine was established in the case of Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus, 
210 US 339 (1908) and later codified in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) through the Copyright Act.8  Under 
the doctrine, a person that purchases a copyrighted work from the copyright holder obtains the 
right to sell, display, or dispose of the good.9 Basically, after that initial sale, the property rights 
are transferred to the buyer who can then use the product however he or she wishes 
notwithstanding the distribution interests of the copyright holder. There is an exception that the 
new owner cannot make copies of the item; that action is still considered infringement. The right 
                                                
6 In CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, CBS owned copyrights to six sound recordings. CBS authorized a 
Philippines-based music corporation, Vicor Music Corporation, to produce and sell several of the copyrighted 
recordings. These particular recordings were only to be sold in the Philippines. In June 1981, Vicor sold copies of 
the CBS recordings to Rainbow Music, Inc., also based in the Philippines. Rainbow Music sold the records to the 
Nevada state corporation, International Traders, Inc., which in turn sold them to Scorpio, a company in the state of 
Pennsylvania. Several months later, in November 1981, CBS terminated the manufacturing agreement with Vicor. 
As part of the termination agreement, Vicor had sixty days to sell off its inventory. All of the transactions leading to 
Scorpio’s possession of the recordings occurred during this period. CBS sued Scorpio, alleging that it imported 
copyrighted works without CBS’s consent and therefore violated the Copyright Act. The court ultimately granted 
CBS’s motion for summary judgment, finding that “lawfully made under this title” in § 109(a) meant that the first 
sale doctrine applied only to goods that had been legally manufactured and sold in the United States and did not 
apply to the purchase of imports. CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984). 
7BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318 (C.A. 9, 1991), <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case= 
13705363198185453600&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 16 March 2011). 
8 See “Controlling Cases” section for the complete facts of Bobbs-Merrill. 
9“Copyright Infringement - First Sale Doctrine,” Criminal Resource Manual, United States Department of Justice, 
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01854.htm> (accessed 23 March 2011). 
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to distribute the purchased good extends only to the particular copy bought and does not allow 
for duplication.10 The purpose of the first sale doctrine is to allow free transactions, be it through 
selling, renting, leasing, or gifting. It enables people that have purchased a good to have a 
property right over it and thereby the ability to use it how they wish. Copyright holders cannot 
interfere with personal transactions.  
 
CONTROLLING CASES 
BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY V. STRAUS, 210 US 339 (1908) 
The first case in the trajectory leading to Costco was Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus, a 
Supreme Court case from 1908 that established the framework for the first sale doctrine. The 
defendants, Isidor Straus and Nathan Straus, ran the famous New York department store, R.H. 
Macy & Company (“Macy’s”). Bobbs-Merrill Company owned the copyright to a book, The 
Castaway, which was sold at Macy’s. Every copy of the book contained the following text: “The 
price of this book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a 
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the copyright.”11 Macy’s, however, was 
selling the book for less than the one-dollar per copy price required under the statement; each 
book was sold for only eighty-nine cents. Bobbs-Merrill brought suit against Macy’s in the 
Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, which consequently 
went to the Circuit Court of Appeals and finally the United States Supreme Court. 
Bobbs-Merrill had sold copies of its books to wholesale dealers. Some of these 
wholesalers sold the book directly to retailers, and others sold them to different wholesalers. In 
                                                
10“Copyright Infringement - First Sale Doctrine,” Criminal Resource Manual, United States Department of Justice, 
<http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/crm01854.htm> (accessed 23 March 2011). 
11Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US 339 (1908), <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2444759653 
364042939&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 22 March 2011). 
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the wholesale dealer chain, the books were sold at a discount from the net retail price despite the 
warning stamped inside the books. Wholesalers could do this though because the written terms 
specified retailers. Furthermore, as the opinion stated, “the wholesale dealers were under no 
agreement or obligation to enforce the observance of the terms of the notice by retail dealers or 
to restrict their sales to retail dealers who would agree to observe the terms stated in the 
notice.”12 Thus, wholesalers were technically exempt from having to sell the books at the one-
dollar price per unit.  
The court determined that the fact pattern in Bobbs-Merrill was not analogous to any 
prior case, and that the issue dealt with the extent of protection that was provided under the 
existing copyright laws, particularly §§ 4952, 4965, and 4970 of the Revised Statutes of the 
United States. In these sections, one phrase was especially crucial—“the sole right of vending the 
same.”13 The Supreme Court reframed the issue: Does the sole right to vend secure for the owner 
of the copyright the right, after a sale of the book to a purchaser, to restrict future sales of the 
book at retail, and to the right to sell it at a certain price per copy, because of a notice in the book 
that a sale at a different price will be treated as an infringement?14  
The court held that the answer to this question was no, and that the statutes did not give 
copyright owners the ability to control the price that books could be sold at by future purchasers 
with whom they did they did have a specific contract. Bobbs-Merrill had already sold the books 
at the price and quantity that it felt appropriate, so it suffered no harm from any later sales being 
                                                
12Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US 339 (1908), <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2444759653 
364042939&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 22 March 2011). 
13Ibid.  
14Ibid.  
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at a lesser cost since the revenues would not go to them.15 Any further restrictions to prices on 
the product would extend beyond the rights afforded under the copyright statutes.  
BMG MUSIC V. PEREZ, 952 F. 2D 318 (1991) 
 BMG Music created and sold phonorecords in the United States, which are defined by the 
Copyright Act as “material objects in which sounds, other than those accompanying a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and 
from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly 
or with the aid of a machine or device.”16 BMG Music also owned copyrights over various sound 
recordings in the phonorecords.17  
 Edmundo Perez solely owned two of his own businesses, La Feria del Disco and La Feria 
del Disco No. 1. In this capacity, Perez purchased BMG Music phonorecords with copyrighted 
sound recordings that had been manufactured abroad, and then sold them in the United States. 
BMG Music sued Perez, maintaining that Perez’s sales violated the Copyright Act. The district 
court issued an injunction against Perez, but Perez continued to sell the copyrighted goods 
without BMG Music’s permission. Perez was found to be in contempt, and the judge ruled that 
he had willfully infringed on the copyright and was required to pay BMG Music both statutory 
damages and attorney’s fees.18 Perez brought the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.  
 Perez argued that his actions were protected under the first sale doctrine. The district 
court relied on the decision in CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984), 
which found that to take advantage of the first sale doctrine, the goods in question had to have 
                                                
15Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 US 339 (1908), <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=2444759653 
364042939&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 22 March 2011). 
1617 U.S.C. § 101, United States Copyright Office, <http://www.copyright.gov/title17/92chap1.html> (accessed 16 
March 2011).  
17BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318 (C.A. 9, 1991) <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1370536 
3198185453600&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 16 March 2011).  
18Ibid. 
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been originally manufactured in the United States because of the “lawfully made under this title” 
clause in the Copyright Act. Because the phonorecords were produced abroad, the first sale 
doctrine did not apply. The district court also rejected Perez’s argument that his infringement 
was de minimis, or minimal, and that § 602(a) was confined to only wholesale importation; since 
Perez had imported multiple copies to resell, he was still in violation.19 Ultimately, the Scorpio 
precedent was upheld.  
QUALITY KING DISTRIBUTORS, INC. V. L’ANZA RESEARCH INTERNATIONAL, INC., 523 U.S. 135 
(1998)  
 
 All of the previous cases discussed had addressed the applicability of §§ 602(a) and 
109(a) for products where the good itself was copyrighted. Quality King raised a new issue for 
the courts: What is the interaction of these rules when the copyright is for a logo instead of a 
good? The respondent L’anza Research International, Inc. (L’anza), based in California, made 
and sold a variety of hair care products, including shampoos and conditioners. On all of its 
products, there was a copyrighted label. L’anza sold its products to domestic distributors in the 
United States, who were able to resell the products to authorized retailers.20 L’anza also sold its 
products in foreign markets. It found, however, that in markets in the United States, consumers 
were willing to pay more for high quality products when they were sold along with lesser quality 
items, especially in conjunction with extensive advertising.21 As a result, L’anza engaged in 
minimal advertising in foreign markets, meaning the prices the company could charge foreign 
distributors were 35% to 40% lower than those for distributors in the United States.22  
                                                
19BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F. 2d 318 (C.A. 9, 1991) <http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=1370536 
3198185453600&hl=en&as_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr> (accessed 16 March 2011). 
20 Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 US 135 (1998), <http://scholar.google.com/ 
scholar_case?case=11630239533508029010&hl=en&as_sdt=100000002&as_vis=1> (accessed 16 March 2011). 
21Ibid. 
22Ibid. 
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 In 1992 and 1993, L’anza sent a shipment of its products, which had been manufactured 
in the United States and bore the copyrighted labels, to a foreign distributor. The petitioner 
Quality King Distributors, Inc. (Quality King) purchased these goods abroad and then sold them 
at discounted prices to unauthorized retailers in the United States. These retailers then sold the 
products in California without L’anza’s permission.  
 L’anza sued, asserting that Quality King’s actions violated L'anza's “exclusive rights 
under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501, and 602 to reproduce and distribute the copyrighted material in the 
United States.”23 In district court, L’anza filed a motion for summary judgment, while Quality 
King presented a defense using the first sale doctrine. The court rejected the defense, and granted 
the summary judgment in favor of L’anza.24 Quality King appealed, and lost. The Supreme Court 
then granted cert to the case, which was argued on December 8, 1997.  
 The question before the Court was whether § 602(a) of the Copyright Act, which gives 
the copyright owner the right to prohibit the unauthorized importation of copies, was limited by 
the first sale doctrine. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court found that the Copyright Act 
was in fact limited by the first sale doctrine, ruling in favor of Quality King on March 9, 1998. 
The Court’s rationale was that, since Quality King was a lawful owner of the products after 
purchasing them, the company could resell them under the first sale doctrine. Justice Stevens 
wrote the majority opinion, stating that, “The whole point of the first sale doctrine is that once 
the copyright owner places a copyrighted item in the stream of commerce by selling it, he has 
exhausted his exclusive statutory right to control its distribution.”25 
 
                                                
23Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 US 135 (1998), <http://scholar.google.com/ 
scholar_case?case=11630239533508029010&hl=en&as_sdt=100000002&as_vis=1> (accessed 16 March 2011). 
24Ibid. 
25Ibid. 
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*          *          * 
 
 Even after these various cases helped shape the meaning of Copyright Act, the courts still 
had not addressed several critical issues. Following Bobbs-Merrill, it was clear that the first sale 
doctrine existed. The BMG precedent had also been stable, meaning that “lawfully made under 
this title” required domestically-produced goods if the buyer wished to invoke the first sale 
doctrine. And in Quality King, the Supreme Court determined that once goods had been exported 
from the United States, reimportation was permissible because the exporter would have 
anticipated relinquishing rights under the first sale doctrine. But there was still ambiguity over 
the different requirements of §§ 602(a) and 109(a). The Supreme Court had yet to make a clear 
decision on how the Copyright Act applied to imports, and if the first sale doctrine could act as a 
defense for goods that were originally manufactured abroad. This hole in this interpretation of 
the Copyright Act set the stage for the Supreme Court to hear Costco. 
 
THE COSTCO V. OMEGA DECISION 
On December 13, 2010, the United States Supreme Court released its decision in Costco 
Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), which was granted cert from the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in California. The petitioner Costco Wholesale Corporation, or 
Costco, is a company that operates warehouses where people that pay for membership can 
purchase a selection of branded and private-label products at low prices.26 Costco buys most of 
its goods directly from manufacturers and ships straight to the member warehouses. Omega S. A. 
is based in Switzerland, and produces upscale watches that it sells worldwide. On the back of 
every watch it manufactures, Omega engraves a tiny symbol called the Omega Globe Design, 
                                                
26“Costco Wholesale Corporation,” Google Finance, <http://www.google.com/finance?client=ob&q=NASDAQ: 
COST> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
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which is registered under the United States Copyright Act.27 Omega contended that its rationale 
for affixing the copyrighted design to all of its watches was so that it could use Title 17 of the 
Copyright Act to control the importation and sale of its watches in the United States, which had 
been purchased through authorized foreign distributors.28  
In the case at hand, Omega sold watches with its copyrighted logo to an authorized 
distributor abroad. A third party bought the watches and sold them to ENE Limited, a company 
based in New York, which in turn sold the watches to Costco.29 Costco made these watches 
available for customers to purchase in its warehouses.  Omega, however, had not directly given 
Costco permission to sell these particular watches—the Omega Seamaster Collection—at its 
United States warehouses; it had only authorized the initial foreign sale, which was intended to 
sell the watches in South America, and had not authorized importation or any subsequent sales to 
the United States.30 Costco had essentially purchased the goods on the “gray market”—under 
Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc. 38 F.3d 477, 481 n.6 (9th Cir. 1994), “‘gray-
market goods’ or ‘parallel imports’ are genuine products possessing a brand name protected by a 
trademark or copyright...They are typically manufactured abroad, and purchased and imported 
into the United States by third parties, thereby bypassing the authorized U.S. distribution 
channels.”31  
Moreover, the watches that were designated to be sold in certain foreign markets were 
less expensive than those meant for the United States, so by purchasing the watches through the 
                                                
27“Brief for the Petitioner,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar 
Association, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs 
_09_10_08_1423_Petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf > (accessed 15 March 2011). 
28Ibid. 
29“Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A.,” Legal Information Institute at Cornell University School of Law, 
<http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-1423> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
30“Opinion,” Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 541 F.3d 982 (C.A. 9, Sept. 3, 2008), 
<http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2008/09/03/0755368.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
31Ibid.  
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chain involving several different distributors, Costco was able to effectively buy identical 
watches at a lower cost than other distributors in the United States.32 Consequently, Costco’s 
gray-market purchase meant it could sell the watches to consumers at an amount below Omega’s 
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRP). Costco was selling the Seamaster watches in 
California for $1,299 US, while the MSRP for United States sellers was $1,995 US.33 
Omega sued Costco, alleging that Costco’s initial purchase of the watches and then its 
sales to end consumers constituted copyright infringement under the Copyright Act since the Act 
gives authors of copyrighted works the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, display, license, 
and prepare their work.34 Omega moved for summary judgment in district court, but Costco filed 
a cross-motion citing the first sale doctrine, also under the Copyright Act, which states that 
certain ownership and control rights are exhausted after the initial sale of a copyrighted good. In 
particular, after a manufacturer sells a good, it loses the ability to set prices for the item by 
asserting a copyright claim. The district court found in favor of Costco on both motions and also 
awarded Costco $373,003.80 in attorney’s fees; Omega appealed to the United States Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, located in California.35  
The appellate court ultimately reversed the summary judgment ruling as well as the 
district court’s award of legal fees. The Ninth Circuit Court analyzed whether the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 
                                                
32Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A.,” Legal Information Institute at Cornell University School of Law, 
<http://topics.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/08-1423> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
33Daniel Fisher, “Costco v. Omega is About Much More Than Cheap Watches,” Forbes, 5 November 2010, 
<http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/11/05/costco-v-omega-is-about-much-more-than-cheap-watches/> 
(accessed 15 March 2011). 
3417 U.S.C. § 106, Legal Information Institute at Cornell University School of Law, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/17/usc_sec_17_00000106----000-.html> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
35“Opinion,” Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 541 F.3d 982 (C.A. 9, Sept. 3, 2008), 
<http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2008/09/03/0755368.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
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135 (1998) required the interpretation of the first sale doctrine that Costco advanced.36 It decided 
that Quality King was not irreconcilable with the precedent in BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 
318 (1991), which confined the scope of the first sale doctrine to copies of goods that were 
legally made in the United States.37 Furthermore, it found that the phrase, “lawfully made under 
this title,” which is under § 109(a) of the Copyright Act, also applied only to goods that had been 
manufactured in the United States; any other interpretation would impermissibly extend the 
application of the Copyright Act extraterritorially.38  
This framework distinguished Costco from Quality King since in the latter, the goods had 
originally been produced in the United States, were exported overseas, then came back in the 
country, while Omega’s watched were manufactured abroad initially. In its opinion, the Ninth 
Circuit Court stated, “Because there is no genuine dispute that Omega made the copies of the 
Omega Globe Design in Switzerland, and that Costco sold them in the United States without 
Omega’s authority, the first sale doctrine is unavailable as a defense to Omega’s claims.”39 Since 
the watches were made in Switzerland and not the United States, under the binding BMG Music 
ruling the first sale doctrine did not apply.  
Costco appealed, and on April 19, 2010, the United States Supreme Court granted cert to 
the case. The case was argued on November 8, 2010, and the court ruled just over a month later, 
on December 13, 2010. The question before the court was whether the first sale doctrine applies 
to imported goods manufactured abroad.40 Justice Kagan, who had filed a brief in an earlier 
phase of the case while she was still Solicitor General and before she was appointed to the 
                                                
36See “Controlling Cases” section for the complete facts of Quality King.  
37See “Controlling Cases” section for the complete facts of BMG Music.  
38“Opinion,” Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, 541 F.3d 982 (C.A. 9, Sept. 3, 2008), 
<http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2008/09/03/0755368.pdf> (accessed 15 March 2011). 
39Ibid. 
40“Brief for the Petitioner,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar 
Association, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs 
_09_10_08_1423_Petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf > (accessed 15 March 2011). 
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Supreme Court, recused herself from voting.41 With the recusal, the Court failed to reach a 
majority opinion and was deadlocked in a 4-4 decision, meaning that the appellate court decision 
favoring Omega remained. The per curiam opinion that was released simply stated, “The 
judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.”42 There was no further analysis, no rationale 
for the ruling, and no reference to how individual justices voted. The evenly split ruling also 
meant that the case provided no precedential value. Costco could have provided a way for the 
Supreme Court to clarify important aspects of the Copyright Act, but instead the curious ruling 
left even more questions unanswered.   
 
                                                
41Justice Kagan’s brief, filed on behalf of the government in 2009, argued that the petition for a writ of certiorari 
should be denied. The brief stated that the lower court’s opinion was consistent with Quality King and supported the 
existing case theory that § 602 should trump § 109. It also indicated that the location of manufacture was important 
to consider. The complete text of the brief is available from the United States Department of Justice at 
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/2009/2pet/6invit/2008-1423.pet.ami.inv.pdf.  
42“Opinion,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010),  <http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
opinions/10pdf/08-1423.pdf> (accessed 16 March 2011). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE ECONOMICS | IF THE MODEL DOESN’T FIT… 
 
ecause of the failure to reach a majority opinion, the courts have been largely silent on 
the extent of applying the Copyright Act to goods which are not themselves copyrighted, 
and in particular to goods that have been manufactured internationally. Economics can play a 
role in navigating these complex legal issues. Looking at economic models can help craft a 
framework to determine the scope of the first sale doctrine.  
ECONOMIC MODELS FOR LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The fact pattern in Costco incorporates components from three economic models: patents, 
copyrights, and price discrimination. The standard versions of these models are analyzed below, 
with insight on what elements may be applicable to the Costco case as well as the models’ 
limitations. These models also provide guidance to determine what the core issues in Costco are, 
and if the case is actually about copyright or if different issues are hiding beneath the guise of 
copyright infringement.  
 
B 
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PATENTS 
 Intellectual property encompasses patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. 
While intellectual property is intangible, it possesses many of the characteristics of a public good 
in that once it is created, it can be reused without diminishing its quantity.43 As a result, public 
goods create increased benefit when more people have access to and use them. But with 
intellectual property, there are numerous costs, like research and development costs, involved in 
actually creating the good, or idea. Patents provide incentives to make the costs incurred in 
creating an idea worth the benefits because of the chance to have exclusive property rights. 
While patents help provide production incentives, they also create monopolists and monopoly 
prices, which prevents society from realizing the maximum benefit.  
Application to Costco Facts 
 This model has some applicability to the Costco case in that it is a standard intellectual 
property issue. Copyrights, like patents, do provide a level of exclusive use. Once a company has 
a registered copyright, it prevents another organization from using a strikingly similar or easily 
confusable image. Copyrights are also intangible, and have the same type of public good 
properties in that a copyright can technically be reused without diminishing its quantity.  
 Unlike patents, a copyright holder does not have the same type of strong monopoly 
power that comes from preventing potential competitors from using a certain process or creating 
a particular good. A copyright does not prevent others from producing watches, they just cannot 
produce an “Omega” watch. But it is possible that there is some sort of monopoly effect that 
results from the value of the brand, which is indicated by the copyrighted logo. Even though the 
logo itself, by virtue of it being merely a design, is not a marketable product, it is critical when it 
                                                
43Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach to Law, Second Edition, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009) , 
p. 180. 
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is affixed to a tangible good. In this case, that good is a watch. The logo acts as a signal to the 
consumer that they are purchasing an Omega watch, which is believed to be a high-quality 
luxury watch. With this brand recognition, a company can charge a sort of monopoly price 
because they are excluding other watch manufacturers from the same level of brand value. 
Another view of this concept is that they have essentially created a unique product, and since no 
other competitor can create an Omega watch without violating the copyright, Omega can charge 
a higher monopoly-like price on its watches. This also means that there are incentives to increase 
the value of the brand that is associated with the logo, which is analogous to the production 
incentives that result from patent protection.44  
 Another similarity comes from the intuition behind marginal cost. With a patent, the 
fixed costs that are involved come from research and development. With copyrights, this 
translates into the time to design the logo and receive registration. Yet after these fixed costs 
have been incurred, the marginal costs are virtually, if not actually, zero.45 It is important to 
remember that in the Omega case, the production of the watches are not of concern, but the 
actual copyrighted logo. Since the marginal cost is the cost of producing each additional unit of 
output, once a design has been created, the cost of duplicating it is almost nonexistent. Thus, like 
with the patent model, there will also be declining average costs.  
Limits of the Model  
 The obvious problem of applying this model is that it is specific to patents, which are not 
involved in Costco. Patents are primarily distinguishable because they apply to the invention or 
                                                
44 It is possible that one of Omega’s problems with Costco selling its Seamaster Collection watches was that it could 
diminish the brand value. Costco has the connotation of being cheap, which contradicts the idea of luxury that 
Omega wants its watches to exemplify. The law, however, cannot provide any recourse for brand diminution. Not 
only would quantifying the harm and extent of the brand dilution be difficult, but it would open the door to a 
plethora of disputes.  
45John F. Duffy, “The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property,” The University of Chicago Law Review, 
(Winter 2004), Vol. 71, Issue 1, p.37-56, <http://www.warsystems.hu/wp-content/uploads_bodo/Duffy-The%20 
Marginal%20Cost%20Controversy%20in%20Intellectual%20Property.pdf> (accessed 6 April 2011). 
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discovery of any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement on something existing.46 Copyrights, on the other hand, pertain 
to original works of authorship and forms of expression as opposed to subject matter. Patents 
have a life of twenty years, and give the patent holder the right to exclude others from making, 
using, offering for sale, or selling the invention in the United States or importing the invention 
into the United States.47 A copyright provides the owner with the exclusive right to reproduce the 
copyrighted work, to prepare derivative works, to distribute copies, and to display the 
copyrighted work publicly. Since the types of protections and the objects being protected differ, 
the model does not fit copyright scenarios perfectly.  
 The predominant benefit of obtaining a patent is the ability to hold a monopoly for a 
period of time and earn monopoly profits. While it was previously argued that some type of 
monopoly pricing power could result from a strong brand value associated with a copyrighted 
logo, the clear differential with a patent is that its intent is to provide a monopoly. There are 
strong incentives to hold a patent because of the assurance that you will have pricing power and 
be able to eliminate direct competition. This certainty does not come with a copyright in the 
same way, meaning that the model is accounting for incentives that are not present in a copyright 
case.  
 Because a copyright is for an image and not a tangible product, producers will also not 
necessarily determine the level of output based on where marginal revenue equals marginal cost 
like with a patent. After all, a company does not sell copies of the logo, and it is unclear if the 
products stamped with the logo could be produced at an MR = MC level. It is possible that there 
will not be any monopoly profits or deadweight loss, and prices might not rise as greatly so as to 
                                                
46“General Information Concerning Patents,” United States Patent and Trademark Office, January 2010, 
<http://www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.jsp#heading-2> (accessed 6 April 2011).  
47Ibid.   
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cause such a drastic reduction in consumer surplus. Because of the uncertainty with the 
copyright’s impact on the actual tangible good, this model cannot predict the pricing and output 
effects strongly. These prediction problems further suggest that the issues in Costco are not truly 
centered about intellectual property.  
COPYRIGHT 
 Landes and Posner derive a model that is specific to copyrights and focuses on both the 
incentive and cost of expression effects of differing degrees of copyright protection. They 
assume that creators and copiers produce quality-adjusted copies that are perfect substitutes, 
demand is not subject to uncertainty, the cost of expression is the only fixed cost of an expressive 
work, and the marginal costs for creators are constant.48 The model consists of the following:49 
  p = price of a copy 
  q(p) = market demand for copies of a given work 
  x = number of copies produced by the creator 
  y = number of copies produced by the copier 
  c = creator’s marginal cost per copy 
  e = cost of expression 
  z =level of copyright protection 
 
From this, we can simplify to q = x + y. The level of copyright protection is constrained between 
the values of zero and one; z = 0 occurs when there is no copyright protection, and z = 1 
represents absolute protection where no copy can be made without permission from the 
copyright holder. Landes and Posner also assume that copiers will produce duplicates up to the 
quantity where price equals marginal cost.  
In the graphic representation, D(q) is the overall market demand for copies, DD is the 
creator’s derived demand for copies, MRDD is the marginal revenue for derived demand, and       
                                                
48William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 71.  
49Ibid.  
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y = y(p,z0) is the copiers’ supply curve. The resulting shaded box, R0, shows the gross profits 
(where ! = (p - c)x - e(z) ) that the creator of an expressive work will earn.  
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Figure 1: Landes and Posner’s economic model for copyright. 
 
 
According to the explanation that Landes and Posner provide, “Some copyright 
protection is necessary to generate incentives to incur the costs of creating easily copied works. 
But too much protection can raise the costs of creation to a point at which current authors cannot 
cover their costs even though they have complete copyright protection for their own 
originality.”50 Changing the level of copyright protection has several impacts. First, as z 
increases, the price per copy rises and consequently the number of copies that are sold decreases, 
resulting in a larger deadweight loss. This movement also leads to an increase in the creator’s 
gross profits and creates a producer surplus.  
 But the effect does not stop there—the impact is also felt on the market for new works. 
The total number of works created is denoted by N. Landes and Posner suggest that the number 
                                                
50William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 74.  
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of works that an author creates will rise until the cost of expression of the marginal author equals 
the gross profit. Similarly, N will also rise as copyright protection increases, until it reaches the 
point where the cost of the marginal author’s expression equals his or her return. Thus, the 
supply of works depends on both the amount of gross profits from selling copies (R) as well as 
the level of copyright protection, or N = N(R,z). In the below figure, z1 delineates increased 
copyright protection. Landes and Posner also emphasize that because they two effects can 
counteract one another, the net effect of increasing z on N is uncertain.  
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Figure 2: The impact on the market for new works. 
 
 
Recall the earlier example where an increase in z led to greater prices, lower output, and 
higher gross profit. The rise in gross profits will decrease the supply of new works because 
creators can continue to sell their work at a high price and not have to invest in the costs of 
expression required to make a new product. Thus, producer surplus is actually decreased in the 
new works market.  
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Application to Costco Facts 
 The level of copyright protection, or z, in the Landes and Posner model is important for 
the Costco case. With the denunciation of the first sale doctrine for internationally-manufactured 
products, z essentially increases; by producing goods abroad, a company receives more copyright 
protection than they would if the goods were produced domestically. This is then also a de facto 
decrease in z for domestic producers because they obtain fewer rights from the same copyright 
process in comparison. In either circumstance, z is affected in some way.  
Limits of the Model  
 A main problem with the model is that, while it is specific to copyright, it is also focused 
heavily on works like books and plays that can easily duplicated and be used. With Omega, the 
consumers are not purchasing the logo to use like they would buy a copyrighted text to read. 
Omega is in the business of making watches as opposed to expressive works; the market demand 
is not for copies like in the model. The incentives of continuing to create expressive works that 
the model represents are not the same for Omega as for an author. There is no benefit to Omega 
creating a new logo, just a new watch stamped with the existing logo. Thus, the market for new 
works that Landes and Posner derive is irrelevant as well.  
 While the Landes and Posner model explains how traditional copyright cases work, it 
provides little insight into how Costco should have been decided. This is puzzling; Omega sued 
Costco for copyright infringement, but the economic model for copyright does not apply to the 
facts of the case. Most importantly, this model makes it clear that while copyright infringement 
is the central legal debate, it is not actually the core issue of the case. If Costco was truly about 
copyright, then the Landes and Posner model should fit well. The reason that a standard 
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copyright model is inapplicable is because a copyright claim is purely a means that Omega is 
using to stifle parallel importation so that it can continue to price discriminate.  
PRICE DISCRIMINATION  
 Price discrimination is often a concern because it has properties of a monopoly where 
producers charge consumers different prices for the same good. Monopolies have the potential to 
create an inefficient allocation of resources, making price discrimination a poor process. There 
are three different types of price discrimination: first degree, second degree, and third degree. 
Under first degree price discrimination, which is also know as perfect discrimination, each unit 
of a good is sold at the consumer’s reservation price. This effectively eliminates consumer 
surplus and redistributes it all to producer’s surplus. Second degree price discrimination differs 
in that demand is divided into subgroups based on multiple consumers’ reservation prices, and 
each block is charged approximately that price.  
The final type is third degree price discrimination, which is present in the Costco case. 
With third degree price discrimination, consumers can be segmented into two or more groups, 
each of which has its own continuous demand function reflecting quantities sold to that group at 
alternative prices.51 Often these divisions can be made based on differing price elasticities of 
demand; a group with a low price elasticity will be one segment, and a group with a high price 
elasticity will be another. Producers chose this strategy because it maximizes profits.  
 
                                                
51F.M. Scherer and David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, (Houghton Mifflin 
Company: Boston, 1990), p. 490.  
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Figure 3: The third degree price discrimination model. 
 
 
Figure 3 portrays the effect of third degree price discrimination. The graphs show the 
global market segmented into only two groups, Market A and Market B. Because the producer is 
manufacturing the same good in the same location, marginal cost will remain constant regardless 
of the market segment. In the distinct segments, however, there will be differing demand and 
marginal revenue curves depending on the local price elasticities for the product. The demand 
curve in Market A is very steep, indicating that the market’s price elasticity is low. In contrast, 
Market B shows a flatter demand curve, which translates into a higher price elasticity. As the 
graphs show, despite the same marginal cost, the particular demand and therefore marginal 
revenue for the market alters prices. The price discriminating producer will charge higher prices 
in the less elastic Market A and lower prices in Market B to earn the greatest profits possible.  
If there are factors that prevent a producer from segmenting the market either across the 
board or only for certain classes of consumers, producers will likely switch to a uniform price to 
maintain profits. Since markets were previously divided, this new uniform price may be higher 
than before for some segments. With uniform pricing, the aggregate demand function has two 
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components that depend on if, at the new price, all markets are served.52 If the uniform price 
rises to a certain point, the producer will drop certain high-elasticity markets from service 
because not enough consumers will purchase the goods at the raised price. Another result is that 
output is redistributed from low-demand markets to high-demand markets, which equates 
marginal valuations thereby increasing welfare, or the sum or producer and consumer surplus.53 
Profit will always be lower under a uniform pricing scheme since a producer cannot have the full 
benefits of monopoly power, but what matters is if this loss for producers is offset by gains in 
consumer surplus.  
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Figure 4: The impact of moving from third degree price  
discrimination to a uniform price level across all markets. 
 
 
These effects are illustrated above in Figure 4. A uniform price will be lower than the 
discriminating price in Market A, but higher in Market B. The result is that consumer surplus is 
basically redistributed from the high-elasticity market to the low-elasticity market from a global 
                                                
52David A. Malueg and Marius Schwartz, “Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price 
Discrimination,” Journal of International Economics, (1994), Vol. 37, p. 167-195, ScienceDirect, 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com> (accessed 10 April 2011) p. 175.  
53Ibid, p. 175. 
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perspective. Looking at an isolated market, the same effect could be described as shifting the 
surplus from consumers to producers. The shaded areas in Figure 4 reflect these changes; in 
Market A, the gray represents additional consumer surplus and it Market B it depicts lost 
consumer surplus.  
Application to Costco Facts 
 In Costco, Omega used third degree price discrimination to divide consumers. Omega 
segmented the market based on country, charging consumers in some countries higher price than 
in other countries. This is likely because the United States had a lower price elasticity of demand 
for luxury watches, which will be explored further in Chapter 3. By preventing the first sale 
doctrine, the Supreme Court implicitly supported price discrimination between markets.  
Limits of the Model 
 While perhaps not a true limitation, one aspect of the model that is not of concern in this 
case is the shift away from low-demand countries that would result from less of an ability to 
price discriminate. As the model demonstrates, when a company is unable to price discriminate, 
they will likely move to uniform pricing eventually and shift sales from low-demand countries to 
high-demand countries. The worry is that these markets will not be served and that this shifts 
welfare away from these countries. While this would be problematic for goods that are more of 
necessities, it does not matter for a product like the luxury watches in the Costco case.  
 
ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF THE DECISION 
HIGHER PRICES 
 Costco was able to sell the Omega watches at reduced prices to consumers because they 
purchased the watches abroad through parallel importation. Omega had segmented the market, 
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charging higher prices in the United States and lower prices in other foreign markets. Often when 
this price discrimination occurs, wholesale importers and distributors will arbitrage goods to take 
advantage from the cheaper foreign prices.54 If Costco was restricted from importing the 
discounted products, it would be required to buy the watches at the higher rate quoted to United 
States distributors, meaning that the higher prices would be passed along to the consumers. 
Furthermore, according to an amici curiae brief submitted by the Retail Industry Leaders 
Association, “Parallel importation also prevents manufacturers from maintaining price driven 
market segmentation by propping up prices domestically and depressing prices in foreign 
markets, in favor of global equilibrium pricing.”55 The overall effect would be constantly high 
prices for imported goods in the United States market.  
PRODUCTION INCENTIVES 
 With the decision affirming the lower court’s ruling in favor of Omega, additional 
protection was provided to goods that were manufactured abroad since they are not be subject to 
the first sale doctrine. This result provides a strong incentive for companies to move production 
abroad because they will be able to retain rights after a sale. Because of the Costco decision, 
“...companies can protect virtually anything by slapping a tiny, copyrighted logo on it and 
producing it overseas. As the owner of the copyright, they can dictate whether or not it’s sold in 
the U.S. and under what terms.”56  
There are also minimal costs involved for companies making the incentive of greater 
protection even more attractive. Since the new first sale interpretation requires that only the 
                                                
54“Brief Amici Curiae of Retail Industry Leaders Association, et. al., in Support of the Petitioner,” Costco Wholesale 
Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar Association, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1423_PetitionerAmCu7RetailCos.authcheck
dam.pdf > (accessed 22 March 2011).  
55Ibid.  
56Daniel Fisher, “Costco v. Omega is About Much More Than Cheap Watches,” Forbes, 5 November  2010, 
<http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2010/11/05/costco-v-omega-is-about-much-more-than-cheap-watches/> 
(accessed 26 March 2011). 
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copyrighted portion of the product be manufactured abroad, companies can reap the advantages 
without incurring exorbitant relocation costs for entire production plants. Actually obtaining the 
copyright is inexpensive as well because it requires creating a simplistic—yet original, a very 
low threshold—design and registering it with the United States copyright office for a fee that is 
less that fifty dollars.57 Barriers are minimal since this process does not require any prolonged 
research and development efforts and high proofs of novelty like for a patent. Creating a 
copyrightable logo could take just a matter of minutes.  
The question regarding incentives to produce abroad was brought up in the Supreme 
Court oral argument when Justice Alito asked the counsel for the respondent: “Well, what is your 
answer to the argument that if ‘lawfully made under this title’ means basically made in the 
United States, that provides a great incentive to manufacture goods abroad and that can't possibly 
be what Congress intended?”58 The attorney agreed.  
AFTERMARKETS  
 Aftermarkets include segments such as video rentals, garage sales, used bookstores, and 
other rental or resale industries and transactions. All of these aftermarkets are currently legal. 
They also account for a substantial flow in the economy. Retail commerce in copyrighted works 
sold in the United States was $881 billion in 2009, movie rentals showed earnings of $9.5 billion 
in 2008, sales of used video games topped $2.4 billion in revenue in 2009, and currently the 
overall market for used goods is over $200 billion.59 The reason that all these aftermarkets are 
                                                
57“Brief Amici Curiae of American Association of Law Libraries, et. al., in Support of the Petitioner,” Costco 
Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar Association, <http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_09_10_08_1423_PetitionerAmCu6Non
ProfitOrgs.authcheckdam.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2011) , p.14. 
58“Oral Argument Transcript,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), 8 November 2010, 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1423.pdf> (accessed 22 March 2011).  
59“Brief for the Petitioner,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar 
Association, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdf 
s_09_10_08_1423_Petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2011), p. 47.  
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able to exist is because of the first sale doctrine, since goods can be sold over and over again 
without control from the producer or prior owners.  
Under Costco, however, copyright holders that manufacture their products abroad would 
be able to restrict rental, lease, and other lending-based industries.60 These aftermarkets could be 
crippled. Moreover, the effects would extend beyond the aftermarkets and spill into primary 
markets. By preventing consumers and industries from having the ability to sell used goods or to 
rent out goods, one of the original incentives for buying is diminished and purchases of 
copyrighted goods in primary markets may decrease as well. Thus, the impacts infiltrate deep 
into numerous industries.  
 
                                                
60“Brief for the Petitioner,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), American Bar 
Association, <http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdf 
s_09_10_08_1423_Petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf> (accessed 26 March 2011), p. 47. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE DECISION | WAS THE LAW WRONG? 
 
he prior models revealed that Costco does not fit the criteria for a typical copyright case, 
but rather uses copyright law protections as a means to price discriminate and increase 
profits. Building upon this insight, it is possible to more closely apply the models and determine 
whether or not the ruling in Costco was the best decision from an economic standpoint, using 
domestic welfare as a metric. Moving beyond Costco, there is also the potential to use alternative 
decision-making paradigms based on economic frameworks in the future, including output-based 
rules and contracts.  
 
A WELFARE-MAXIMIZING RULING 
 The standard base measure for determining the efficacy of outcomes is maximum 
economic welfare, or the sum of producer and consumer surplus. In cases of parallel imports, 
however, there is much debate over focusing on national welfare versus global welfare. Welfare 
resulting from parallel imports is essentially zero-sum; when welfare improves for some markets, 
T 
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it decreases welfare in others. As a result, national welfare may increase or decrease for a 
country, but global welfare may remain unchanged or may move in the opposite direction.  
 The best economic decision regarding welfare then depends on the role of the Supreme 
Court. Of course, the textbook answer from any introductory American government course 
teaching checks and balances will be that the duty of the Supreme Court, as part of the judicial 
branch, is to interpret the law. A melodramatic response might indicate that the role of the 
Supreme Court is to uphold justice. But beyond that, the real question that is important for the 
Costco case is determining what class of persons that the Supreme Court is responsible for 
protecting. It seems that on a pure binary level, by virtue of being in the United States and a tool 
for recourse predominantly for United States citizens, the Supreme Court should weigh the 
interests of United States consumers and producers greater than those of international consumers 
and producers. This is not to say that the Supreme Court should turn a blind eye to the 
repercussions that may result elsewhere, but concern for these issues should not be a 
fundamental guiding force. Essentially, in welfare terms, if the Supreme Court used an economic 
framework for decision-making the focus should be on maximizing domestic welfare as opposed 
to global welfare.  
 With this in mind, the best ruling from an economic standpoint would be to maximize 
welfare in the United States. The Costco case does not do this. To determine if welfare is greater 
or lower in a world with the third degree price discrimination that is allowed under Costco, it is 
necessary to look at the elasticity of demand. Consumers in low-elasticity markets will be 
adversely affected by price discrimination because, since a low elasticity means that demand is 
not as sensitive to price changes, they will face higher prices for goods. On the converse, 
consumers in high-elasticity markets, where demand is very responsive to price changes, will 
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pay lower prices. While specific data on the current price elasticity for luxury watches is limited, 
older studies shed light on the elasticity properties of watches in the United States. In a 2001 
study, Carbaugh found the price elasticity of watches to be 0.4.61 Similarly, de Vries determined 
that the price elasticity of jeweled watches was 1.04 using a scale that ranged from 0-21.1 to 
compare 176 commodities imported into the United States.62 With insight from both of these 
studies as well as knowing how luxury goods generally act, it is a fair assumption that Omega 
watches have a low price elasticity of demand in the United States. In fact, this is likely why 
Omega price discriminates and charges higher prices for its watches in the United States 
compared to other markets. Thus, segmented-market pricing lowers welfare in the United States.  
 A ruling favoring Costco instead of Omega would have allowed for parallel importation 
of goods manufactured abroad because of the viability of the first sale doctrine. Consumers in the 
United States would be able to obtain the watches at lower prices, increasing consumer surplus. 
Even if Omega eventually adopted a uniform price because of the fear of parallel importation, 
since the United States was already in a high-price market, the uniform price would probably be 
lower. This would cause an increase in consumer surplus in the United States, but also a decrease 
in producer surplus. If we were looking at global welfare, the decrease in producer surplus may 
offset the increase in consumer surplus and leave total welfare unchanged or affected only 
marginally. But the producer surplus reduction is not represented in a domestic welfare 
calculation because the manufacturer is based abroad. From a domestic perspective, surplus has 
                                                
61“Estimating the Impact of Trade Policy Changes on the Price of Imported Products and on Trade in such 
Product,” The International Commercial Diplomacy Project, <http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/manuals/ 
manual_economic2.htm> (accessed 9 April 2011).  
62Barend A. de Vries, “Price Elasticities of Demand for Individual Commodities Imported into the United States,” 
Staff Papers - International Monetary Fund, (1950), Vol. 1, p. 397-419, JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
3866193> (accessed 9 April 2011).  
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only increased, as has total welfare.63 The first sale doctrine and parallel importation allows high-
elasticity markets to reclaim some of the consumer surplus that was lost due to price 
discrimination while still enabling producers to segment markets.  
 Another constrain to account for with respect to welfare is actual output. If output overall 
increases, it is possible that both producer and consumer surplus, and thereby total welfare, can 
rise. According to Malueg and Schwartz (1994), when demand dispersion is large enough 
welfare is actually higher under discrimination than under uniform pricing.64 But if total output is 
no higher under price discrimination than with uniform pricing, welfare will be lower in a 
discrimination situation because it does not equate marginal valuations.65 To make the best 
economic decision, the Supreme Court should have asked if the price discrimination resulted in 
an overall increase in sales; worldwide, did more people have access to this good because they 
were able to price discriminate? While the exact answer to this question is unknown, given that 
Omega watches are a luxury good and are still expensive even in its low-price markets, it is 
unlikely that output due to price discrimination would be significantly higher than under uniform 
pricing. Furthermore, Malueg and Schwartz also argue that, provided that demand is linear, if 
under uniform pricing the monopolist drops no markets, uniform pricing yields higher welfare 
than discrimination.66 Again, because luxury goods are already priced high compared to other 
goods, it does not follow that a uniform price would cause Omega to drop any markets. Welfare 
is worse under discrimination.  
                                                
63 It is possible that a counter effect decreasing surplus some could occur if Omega has shareholders that are based 
in the United States and if the inability to price discriminate hurts the value of their shares.  
64David A. Malueg and Marius Schwartz, “Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price 
Discrimination,” Journal of International Economics, (1994), Vol. 37, p. 167-195, ScienceDirect, 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com> (accessed 9 April 2011), p. 175.  
65Ibid.  
66Ibid.   
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 In sum, the Costco ruling favoring Omega and hindering parallel importation through the 
denunciation of the first sale doctrine for goods manufactured abroad was not economically 
sound because it does not maximize welfare. More importantly, Supreme Court decisions set a 
precedent. And while the 4-4 ruling does not have true precedential value because of the failure 
to reach a majority opinion, it still implicitly affirms the lower court’s ruling. The nature of 
Supreme Court decisions lets this ruling be applied in the future and creates a broad impact, 
meaning that welfare is not decreased just in this particular case but will be reduced in numerous 
other situations that rest upon this decision.  
 
CREATING AN GOOD-BASED TEST 
 One of the problems with why many of the models were not an exact fit for the Costco 
case is because they applied to different types of goods. Intellectual property is a wide category, 
and even within its subdivisions of patents, trademarks, and copyrights there are further 
distinctions to make. Copyrights cover books, music, and in Costco, goods; patents encompass 
computer chips and pharmaceuticals. And these are an extremely minimal sample of the diversity 
that is covered. Landes and Posner appear to recognize this constraint as well, suggesting the 
following as a way to determine the appropriate amount of protection to provide for intellectual 
property:  
 
Ideally, in deciding how broad or narrow an intellectual property right to 
recognize, one would want to classify different forms of intellectual property 
according to the output likely to be produced with and without the recognition of 
such a right and grant such recognition only to those forms in which output would  
be seriously suboptimal without it. So in areas of intellectual property where fixed 
costs were low or other incentives besides the prospect of royalty income were 
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present in force, intellectual property protection would be slight or would even be 
withheld altogether.67 
 
This particular idea involves not judicial review, but the original determination of whether or not 
to grant an intellectual property right and, if so, how much. This is an interesting consideration 
on its own, but it also helps establish a framework for legal analysis. Specifically, it advocates 
classifying intellectual property on a different basis and not just whether it is a patent, trademark, 
or copyright. Intellectual property should be divided based on the level of output that is produced 
as a result of obtaining the property right.  
 With respect to the first sale doctrine and parallel importation, an output-based rule could 
apply as well. The third degree price discrimination model showed that price discrimination is 
good if it results in greater quantities of goods being sold, but it is not beneficial if reduces 
quantity sold or does not impact quantity. Preventing the first sale doctrine also enables third 
degree price discrimination to exist. But since price discrimination only maximizes welfare 
under certain conditions, it follows that the first sale doctrine should also be allowed as a defense 
when certain conditions exist. Based on the model, price discrimination should be encouraged 
when overall output would rise if the producer had the ability to discriminate. The corollary 
would be that in these scenarios, the first sale doctrine should not apply because it would lead to 
lesser output and a decrease in welfare. When price discrimination has no affect on output, the 
first sale doctrine should be allowed because it increases consumer surplus and maximizes 
overall welfare.   
Therefore, instead of creating a uniform rule that, provided that a good is affixed with a 
copyrighted symbol, the first sale doctrine does not apply to goods manufactured abroad, a case-
                                                
67William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, (Cambridge: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 24.  
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by-case rule that depends on how output would be impacted under different pricing scenarios is 
better. Producers have the chance for monopoly profits if price discrimination would enable them 
to increase output and reach more markets, but are restricted when price discrimination does not 
alter output and only eliminates consumer surplus in the push for profits.  
 
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTRACTS 
If a case-by-case model is unappealing, another potential alternative would be to use 
contracts. In the Supreme Court oral argument, Justice Sotomayor set up the framework for this 
possibility and asked, “Why don’t we let contract law control the violations of any agreements 
with foreigners with respect to manufacturing and distribution?”68 Essentially, when 
manufacturers sell their goods they could contract with the buyers that they would not be 
allowed to resell the goods either at all, or not to an unauthorized distributor. Another term could 
be to let purchasers resell goods, but within a price range that the manufacturer sets. This type of 
condition would avoid the real problem that Omega had in the Costco case, which was that 
Costco was selling the watches too cheaply.  
The first sale doctrine would not need to be invoked in these cases because any 
subsequent sale would be considered a breach of contract and contract law remedies could apply. 
Contracts would become the standard rule for any producer that wishes to limit distribution to 
designated markets. As the counsel for the petitioner explained during oral argument, “If the only 
issue were one of contract, there would be no need for § 602(a)(1) because there would be no 
need to create a copyright remedy where contractual remedies are sufficient; that is, in 
                                                
68“Oral Argument Transcript,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), 8 November 2010, 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1423.pdf> (accessed 13 April 2011), p. 46.  
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circumstances where there is privity between the U.S. copyright owner or the U.S. copyright 
owner's direct party and the foreign copyright owner.”69 
While a contract model may work theoretically, it is not necessarily possible. The counsel 
for the respondent argued that doing so would not be practical because many of the people would 
not be in privity of contract with the United States copyright owner. This method may make 
sense for the first several resale transactions that involve corporate distributors or middlemen 
contracting with the producers. The problem arises with the later transactions performed at the 
personal level, like selling goods on eBay or at garage sales. It is not plausible for manufacturers 
to contract with parties at such a minute level, and without doing so, there would be no privity of 
contract thereby preventing enforcement of any remedies. While contracting parties could be 
protected, these other end users may still be vulnerable to copyright claims.  
To avoid the problem of being outside of privity of contract, it would be necessary to also 
make the first sale doctrine applicable to all goods, including those that are manufactured abroad. 
The first sale doctrine then acts as a penalty default rule which a manufacturer has the option to 
contract around, but it also forces the manufacturer to reveal critical information to the other 
contracting party, namely its desire to restrict certain subsequent sales.70 This shifts the burden of 
enforcing a limitation on sales to the manufacturer who must take an action, instead of giving 
any company with a copyright an overarching ability to exercise protection whenever it will 
benefit them. Manufacturers benefit by being able to retain a degree of control over additional 
sales, but this also allows any average consumer that does not enter into a contract to be free 
                                                
69“Oral Argument Transcript,” Costco Wholesale Corporation v. Omega S.A, 562 U.S. __ (2010), 8 November 2010, 
<http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08-1423.pdf> (accessed 13 April 2011), p. 26.  
70Justin Yedor, “Lacking Swiss Precision: The First-Sale Doctrine in Costco v. Omega,” Duke Journal of Law & 
Public Policy Sidebar, (2011), Vol. 6, p. 126-141, <http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/djclpp/index.php?action 
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from the threat of a copyright infringement lawsuit. Because the contract terms would vary 
among parties, the impacts on aggregate domestic welfare are ambiguous. But because buyers 
would have leverage against producers that need to move output and may prefer contracts to the 
first sale doctrine, domestic buyers could feasibly purchase goods more cheaply than under price 
discrimination.   
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
WHY A WATCH MATTERS 
 
upreme Court decisions create precedent. This is why judicial decision-making must be so 
deliberative, so that the full potential impacts of a ruling can be explored and so that 
unintended consequences can be minimized. A person may wonder why he or she should care 
about the sale of a watch. The answer is because of the precedential power of court decisions, 
and how the opinion can be applied in other, perhaps very different, situations. The Costco 
decision is important because the implications extend far beyond watches. As the prior analysis 
has demonstrated, Omega’s rationale for suing Costco stemmed from the desire to continue price 
discriminating instead of a real copyright infringement claim. Copyright was merely masking 
Omega’s true intentions, yet the courts’ rulings throughout the life of Costco explicitly created 
case law regarding copyright law. Legally classified as a copyright case, there is a threat that 
Costco will be applied to future cases and lead to rulings that are at odds with what would be the 
best decision for an actual copyright case, such as book duplication or music distribution.  
S 
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One significant impact of the decision would be on libraries, which are possible because 
of the first sale doctrine. Because after the initial sale the copyright holder loses the ability to 
control the good, libraries are able to lend books again and again. But over 200 million legally 
acquired books in over 9,200 public libraries across the United States have foreign publishers, 
and many books that have publishers based in the United States were manufactured 
internationally.71 Moreover, it is difficult to determine where a text was actually produced unless 
it explicitly states the printing location in the book. Under the Costco interpretation, lending 
these books would no longer be protected under the first sale doctrine and foreign manufacturers 
could assert their copyright holder privileges to sue. Libraries are forced to weigh the benefits of 
providing global works against the risk of liability in a pricey copyright infringement lawsuit.  
Even though some works may still be safe under different protections like fair use, 
implied license, and educational purpose, it is not certain that these defenses would be strong 
enough, especially considering their efficacy would depend upon the whims of changing courts. 
In its amicus brief, the American Library Association noted, “While most copyright owners 
probably would not sue a library for lending a lawfully acquired copy of a foreign printed book, 
libraries will not engage in conduct that is technically unlawful just because there is a low 
probability of litigation.”72 Moreover, there is still the fear that a lawsuit could materialize. 
Libraries are then boxed into knowingly breaking the law if they do not remove books published 
abroad, risking a lawsuit for lending out a book, or undertaking an almost impossible task to 
determine the origin of every book in their collections.  
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The problems are paramount when physical goods exist, but they are intensified with 
digital media. A case easily analogous to the libraries situation is online and digital texts. With 
developments in technology and the trends of personal reading devices and tablets such as the 
Kindle, iPad, and Nook, more books are becoming digitized and uses of electronic books are 
increasing. And libraries are realizing that they can take advantage of e-readers and do not need 
to only operate with physical books. On April 20, 2011, Amazon reversed its policy and made it 
possible to borrow and read e-books from over 11,000 public libraries on the Kindle—a service 
that the Nook and Sony Reader already offered.73 The New York Public Library saw a thirty-six 
percent increase it the use of its e-books between 2010 and 2011, showcasing the prevalence of 
electronic works.74 
Another prime source of online literature is Google Books. In collaboration with several 
universities across the world, Google scanned over 15 million books and made either all of or 
excerpts of the books available on the web.75 Scanning books is technically copying them. If the 
copyright holder did not give the scanner permission to duplicate the book, then it could be 
considered infringement. Google maintained that its actions to create the world’s largest online 
library were legal under the fair use doctrine. Furthermore, Google wanted to have the ability to 
freely digitize orphaned works, or writings that are still under copyright but where their authors 
or copyright holders cannot be found. Full text was only available for books that had given 
Google permission to replicate them or for books where the copyright had already expired. 
Nonetheless, the Authors Guild and the American Association of Publishers sued. The parties 
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ultimately reached a settlement, where Google would pay $125 million, be allowed to continue 
scanning books, and also offer entire texts for sale on the site. Authors that did not want their 
books in the database would have to contact Google and opt out.76 Despite the settlement, Judge 
Denny Chin rejected the agreement in a New York federal district court in March 2011.  
Many people, including Judge Chin, have argued that the issues in the Google Books case 
have grown so complex and because they are likely to arise in the future with other digitized 
publications, it is time for Congress to debate the matter and enact legislation as opposed to 
relying on the courts.77 While Google’s case focused heavily on orphan works and the fair use 
doctrine, it seems that if litigation continues, the first sale doctrine will arise as well. Regardless, 
the Google Books case will thrust questions over copyright to Congress. And in its broad 
copyright inquiry, Costco will inevitably come up. It might then have been the Supreme Court’s 
intention to release such a minimalist statement on Costco, so that the legislative branch would 
not be forced to clash with the judicial branch and potentially denounce and invalidate the 
court’s ruling. When Congress assesses the current nature of copyright and what laws will be 
best to adapt to the future, the same economic theories discussed throughout this paper can 
provide guidance.  
The importance of this decision is that the repercussions do not only apply to 
consumerism, but also extend deeper into the foundations of democracy. There is a societal 
benefit to the existence of physical and online libraries because of their ability to freely provide 
books from across the world for anyone to access. We want to support the free flow of 
information just as much as the free flow of goods. Access to information helps develop a 
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knowledgeable citizenry, which is essential to informed decision making. It is imperative that we 
balance copyright protections for creators of expressive works with the inherent societal benefit 
of providing access to these works to the public. The degree of copyright protection should be 
reasonable, and not an overarching power to have absolute control of a product infinitely. 
Without doing so, the foundations for the free exchange of ideas crumble.  
This case is certainly not about copyright in the traditional sense. Rather, as one of the 
petitioner briefs argued, “Omega is merely attempting to improperly leverage copyright law to 
use a minor, practically invisible logo to obtain absolute control over the disposal of a high value 
product.”78 The economic analysis throughout this paper showed how this practice is rarely 
efficient or welfare maximizing in general, and especially not in the case at hand. Costco is by no 
mean the stopping point of the copyright debate. Congress’s solution should not only afford 
property rights, but also fully assess the economic implications of its actions and consider the 
aforementioned economic theories when crafting new policy.  
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APPENDIX A 
17 U.S.C. § 602. Infringing importation or exportation of copies or phonorecords 
(a) Infringing Importation or Exportation.— 
(1) Importation.—Importation into the United States, without the authority of the 
owner of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been 
acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute 
copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section 501.section 501. 
(2) Importation or exportation of infringing items.—Importation into the United States 
or exportation from the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright under 
this title, of copies or phonorecords, the making of which either constituted an infringement 
of copyright, or which would have constituted an infringement of copyright if this title had 
been applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive right to distribute copies or 
phonorecords under section 106, actionable under sections 501 and 506. 
(3) Exceptions.—This subsection does not apply to— 
(A) importation or exportation of copies or phonorecords under the authority or for 
the use of the Government of the United States or of any State or political subdivision of a 
State, but not including copies or phonorecords for use in schools, or copies of any 
audiovisual work imported for 
purposes other than archival use; 
(B) importation or exportation, for the private use of the importer or exporter and not 
for distribution, by any person with respect to no more than one copy or phonorecord of 
any one work at any one time, or by any person arriving from outside the United States or 
departing from the 
United States with respect to copies or phonorecords forming part of such person’s 
personal baggage; or 
(C) importation by or for an organization operated for scholarly, educational, 
or religious purposes and not for private gain, with respect to no more than one copy 
of an audiovisual work solely for its archival purposes, and no more than five copies or 
phonorecords of any other work for its library lending or archival purposes, unless the 
importation of such copies 
or phonorecords is part of an activity consisting of systematic reproduction or 
distribution, engaged in by such organization in violation of the provisions of section 
108(g)(2). 
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APPENDIX B 
 
§ 109. Limitations on exclusive rights: Effect of transfer of particular copy or phonorecord 
(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or 
phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, 
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord. Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, copies or phonorecords of 
works subject to restored copyright under section 104A that are manufactured before the date of 
restoration of copyright or, with respect to reliance parties, before publication or service of notice 
under section 104A(e), may be sold or otherwise disposed of without the authorization of the 
owner of the restored copyright for purposes of direct or indirect commercial advantage only 
during the 12-month period beginning on —  
(1) the date of the publication in the Federal Register of the notice of intent filed with 
the Copyright Office under section 104A(d)(2)(A), or 
(2) the date of the receipt of actual notice served under section 
104A(d)(2)(B),whichever occurs first. 
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